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ALGORITHMIC PERSONALIZED PRICING
PASCALE CHAPDELAINE*
Price is an essential term at the heart of supplier-consumer transactions and
relationships increasingly taking place in “micro-marketplace chambers,”
where points of comparison with similar relevant products may be difficult to
discern and time-consuming to make. This article critically reviews recent
legal and economic academic literature, policy reports on algorithmic person-
alized pricing (i.e. setting prices according to consumers’ personal character-
istics to target their willingness to pay), as well as recent developments in
privacy regulation, competition law, and policy discourse, to derive the guid-
ing norms that should inform the regulation of this practice, predominantly
from a consumer protection perspective. Looking more closely at algorithmic
personalized pricing through prevailing and conflicting norms of supplier
freedom, competition, market efficiency, innovation, as well as equality, fair-
ness, privacy, autonomy, and transparency, raises important concerns
about certain forms of algorithmic personalized pricing. This article provides
parameters to delineate when algorithmic personalized pricing should be
banned as a form of unfair commercial practice. This ban would address the
substantive issues that algorithmic personalized pricing raises. Resorting to
mandatory disclosure requirements of algorithmic personalized pricing
would address some of the concerns at a procedural level only, and for this
reason is not the preferred regulatory approach. As such, our judgment on
the (un)acceptability of algorithmic personalized pricing as a commercial
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practice is a litmus test for how we should regulate the indiscriminate extrac-
tion and use of consumer personal data in the future.
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INTRODUCTION: WHAT’S WRONG WITH ALGORITHMIC
PERSONALIZED PRICING?
The online commercial experience is highly personalized.
Targeted advertising, search engine results, and movie sugges-
tion lists are based on the collection and use of consumer per-
sonal data to predict and increasingly shape consumers’ pref-
erences and purchasing behavior.
2020] ALGORITHMIC PERSONALIZED PRICING 3
Getting to the terms that actually dictate a commercial re-
lationship between suppliers and consumers, the extent to
which personal data is used to differentiate the prices at which
goods or services are offered to consumers is less clear. Anec-
dotal accounts of personalized pricing abound: airline ticket
purchases, hotel room bookings, and purchases on digital
marketplace platforms such as Amazon.1 While there is a
cloud of uncertainty around the pricing mechanisms at play to
explain such differential prices, studies point toward a strong
aversion to personalized pricing among consumers.2
Price is the single most important term of most consumer
transactions. Algorithmic personalized pricing, as a specific form
of discriminatory pricing, comprises any commercial practice
setting prices according to consumers’ personal characteristics
to target as closely as possible their willingness to pay.3 Price is
also at the heart of supplier-consumer relationships in “micro-
marketplace chambers,” where points of comparison between
similar relevant products may be increasingly hard to discern
and time consuming to make. As such, our judgment on al-
gorithmic personalized pricing as an (un)acceptable commer-
cial practice is a litmus test for how we should regulate the
indiscriminate extraction and uses of consumer personal data
in commerce in the future.
The malleability of price through the use of consumer
personal data involves many areas of law and policy: antitrust,
competition, privacy, contract, consumer protection, and anti-
discrimination.
Algorithmic personalized pricing is receiving growing at-
tention in economic and legal literature.4 Notably, the Organi-
1. See DIRECTORATE FOR FIN. & ENTER. AFF. COMPETITION COMM., OECD,
PERSONALIZED PRICING IN THE DIGITAL ERA—BACKGROUND NOTE BY THE SEC-
RETARIAT 16 (2018), https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP(2018)13
/en/pdf [hereinafter OECD COMPETITION COMMITTEE] (summarizing re-
cent accounts of consumer experiences of personalized pricing documented
in the literature, often negated by suppliers, including Amazon selling prod-
ucts to regular consumers at higher prices, that was uncovered when com-
puter cookies were deleted causing a drop in those prices).
2. See infra Part IV.
3. See infra Part I.
4. See, e.g., ARIEL EZRACHI & MAURICE STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION
(2016); Oren Bar-Gill, Algorithmic Price Discrimination When Demand is a Func-
tion of Both Preferences and (Mis)perceptions, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 217 (2019); Inge
Graef, Algorithms and Fairness: What Role for Competition Law in Targeting Price
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zation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
issued an extensive report on the topic in 2018, gathering re-
search and data from several governments and non-govern-
mental organizations.5 Looking at this commercial practice
through traditional bodies of law and economic principles,
commentators so far have been prudent and reserved concern-
ing the acceptability of algorithmic personalized pricing, mak-
ing no decisive conclusion about what proper regulatory
frameworks should be in place.
This article critically reviews recent legal and economic
academic literature and policy reports on algorithmic person-
alized pricing, as well as recent developments of privacy regu-
lation, competition law, and policy discourse, to derive the
guiding norms that should inform the regulation of al-
gorithmic personalized pricing, predominantly from a con-
sumer protection standpoint. Closely examining algorithmic
personalized pricing through prevailing discursive norms of
supplier freedom, competition, market efficiency, innovation,
equality, fairness, privacy, autonomy, and transparency raises
important concerns about certain forms of algorithmic per-
sonalized pricing that have been overlooked and that merit
closer regulatory scrutiny. The detailed normative analysis con-
ducted in this article provides a rationale to delineate when
algorithmic personalizing pricing should be banned as a form
of unfair commercial practice violating privacy norms. This
ban would address the substantive issues that algorithmic per-
sonalized pricing raises. Resorting to mandatory disclosure re-
Discrimination Towards End Consumers?, 24 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 541 (2017);
Akiva Miller, What Do We Worry About When We Worry About Price Discrimina-
tion? The Law and Ethics of Using Personal Information for Pricing, 19 J. TECH. L.
& POL’Y 41 (2014); Christopher Townley, Eric Morrison & Karen Yeung, Big
Data and Personalized Price Discrimination in EU Competition Law, 36 Y.B. EUR.
L. 683 (2017); Gerhard Wagner & Horst Eidenmüller, Down by Algorithms?
Siphoning Rents, Exploiting Biases, and Shaping Preferences: Regulating the Dark
Side of Personalized Transactions, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 581 (2019); Frederik
Zuiderveen Borgesius & Joost Poort, Online Price Discrimination and EU Data
Privacy Law, 40 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 347 (2017).
5. See OECD, PERSONALIZED PRICING IN THE DIGITAL ERA (2018), http://
www.oecd.org/daf/competition/personalised-pricing-in-the-digital-era.htm
(detailing reports and analyses by OECD and 11 non-governmental organi-
zations and participating countries, including: the European Union, Hun-
gary, Mexico, Netherlands, Portugal, the Russian Federation, Spain, the
United Kingdom and the United States).
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quirements of algorithmic personalized pricing would not ad-
dress the concerns raised by the practice at a substantive level
and, for this reason, should not be the preferred regulatory
approach.
Part I of this article further defines algorithmic personal-
ized pricing by situating it among various forms of discrimina-
tory pricing described in economic theory. Part II queries the
extent to which algorithmic personalized pricing exists, as well
as the regulatory challenges posed by the opacity of this com-
mercial practice. Part III discusses the type of personal data
that are used by suppliers and the (ir)relevance of the public
or private nature of such data. Part IV explores consumers’ low
level of acceptance of personalized pricing. Part V looks at the
prevailing norms regarding algorithmic personalized pricing
and at how they relate to one another: supplier freedom, com-
petition, market efficiency, equality, fairness, privacy, auton-
omy, and transparency—showing areas of concerns for con-
sumers with respect to certain forms of personalized pricing.
Part VI looks at various regulatory avenues and argues in favor
of a ban to address the substantive issues raised by certain
forms of algorithmic personalized pricing, while arguing
against mandatory disclosure requirements for failing to ad-
dress those substantive issues. It also looks at other regulatory
approaches and at the consequences of maintaining the status
quo with no specific regulatory intervention, relying on ex-
isting bodies of law. The article concludes with further areas of
inquiry and study surrounding the use of consumer personal
data in e-commerce.
I.
DISCRIMINATORY PRICING AND ALGORITHMIC PERSONALIZED
PRICING
The exercise of some form of discrimination in pricing
strategies is not a new phenomenon.6 “First-degree price dis-
6. See Andrew Odlyzko, Privacy, Economics, and Price Discrimination on the
Internet, in ICEC2003: FIFTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE 355, 362 & fol. (N. Sadeh ed., 2003) (comparing the 19th century
railway industry in the US, in which companies exercised a high degree of
price discrimination, with digital products supplied over the internet, point-
ing out the similarity of the two environments—i.e., high initial fixed costs
and low marginal costs, creating an incentive to exercise price discrimina-
tion).
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crimination,” or “perfect price discrimination,” refers to an
ideal or theoretical type of price discrimination whereby a sup-
plier is able to determine at an individual level, through use of
detailed personal information, the highest price that a con-
sumer is willing to pay (the “reservation price”) and then of-
fers a good or service individually priced to each consumer.7 It
is an ideal for suppliers in that, if achieved, it maximizes sup-
pliers’ profits by reaching each consumer’s maximum willing-
ness to pay without any remaining consumer surplus. Obvi-
ously, this theoretical ideal is “perfect” for one side of the bar-
gain. There are technical and practical considerations
concerning the likelihood that first-degree price discrimina-
tion is or will be occurring. We explore this further below in
this article.8
“Second-degree price discrimination,” also referred to as
“versioning,” occurs when a supplier offers different prices for
different versions of a good or service such as add-ons, differ-
ent usage durations, or quality levels.9 Here, the discrimina-
tion is exercised in relation to the nature of the good or ser-
vice and is not based on the consumer’s personal characteris-
tics and information per se (although suppliers may
personalize their “versioning” or product options offered
based on the consumer). In the online world, versioning of
products makes price offerings more complex with economic
studies showing that suppliers exploit biases to steer buyers to-
ward certain price points.10 As Ezrachi & Stucke explain, more
complex product offerings require more investment in time
for buyers (or “search costs”), making consumers less inclined
to look for prices elsewhere; such exercise of comparison
might be futile as measuring one complex offering against
7. See OECD COMPETITION COMMITTEE, supra note 1, at 9; EZRACHI &
STUCKE, supra note 4, at 89; Miller, supra note 4, at 55; Townley, Morrison &
Yeung, supra note 4, at 689–90; Zuiderveen Borgesius & Poort, supra note 4,
at 350–53 (summarizing the three common types of price discrimination).
8. See infra Part III.
9. OECD COMPETITION COMMITTEE, supra note 1, at 9; Miller, supra note
4, at 55; Townley, Morrison & Yeung, supra note 4, at 689.
10. EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 4, at 108–09; Miller, supra note 4, at 65
(describing the practice of offering deliberately poor-quality goods to most
price-sensitive consumers and inducing higher-end buyers to opt for product
options at higher price points).
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others may be harder to decipher.11 This creates a cognitive
overload that suppliers may exploit to their advantage.12
“Third-degree price discrimination,” or “group pricing,”
occurs when suppliers charge different prices to different
groups of consumers based on a common characteristic they
share (e.g., age, gender, student status).13 Discount coupons
offered to a targeted group sharing a common characteristic
fall into this category.14 Although the discrimination is based
on at least one personal attribute of the consumer, it remains
removed from first-degree perfect price discrimination dis-
cussed above to the extent that group pricing offers preferen-
tial treatment to one group based on loyalty considerations or
socioeconomic factors and is not specifically aimed at reaching
a consumer’s reservation price.
“Algorithmic personalized pricing,”15 the focus of this ar-
ticle, refers broadly to any practice setting prices according to
consumer personal characteristics, targeting as closely as possi-
ble their willingness to pay.16 While perfect personalized pric-
ing would generally be associated with first-degree price dis-
crimination,17 some commentators opine that online personal-
ized pricing is better characterized as third-degree price
discrimination, i.e. creating groups from a varying degree of
11. Rory Van Loo, Helping Buyers Beware: The Need for Supervision of Big
Retail, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1311, 1329 (2015) (describing how more complex
product offerings and options online make it more difficult to compare
products online); EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 4, at 108–09; SICILANI, RIEFA
& GAMPER, infra note 114, at 13–14, 87–88. See also Miller, supra note 4, at 62,
64–65.
12. EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 4, at 109.
13. OECD COMPETITION COMMITTEE, supra note 1, at 9. See also Miller,
supra note 4, at 55; Townley, Morrison & Yeung, supra note 4, at 690.
14. OECD COMPETITION COMMITTEE, supra note 1, at 11; Kashmir Hill,
How Target Figured Out A Teen Girl Was Pregnant Before Her Father Did, FORBES
(Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/02/16/
how-target-figured-out-a-teen-girl-was-pregnant-before-her-father-did/
#4e4def1434c6 (well-known case of Target department store estimating
probability of pregnancy among women and sending coupons of baby prod-
ucts accordingly).
15. Also referred to as “differential pricing,” see EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra
note 4, at 85–86.
16. OECD COMPETITION COMMITTEE, supra note 1, at 9; EZRACHI &
STUCKE, supra note 4, at 85–86.
17. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 4, at 55.
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personal characteristics.18 So far, the premise has been that
“true” first-degree price discrimination remains a theoretical
concept that is almost impossible to achieve in practice at this
point in time. As such, algorithmic personalized pricing
should be understood as a practice oscillating between near
first-degree and third-degree price discrimination, and that
can also occur with respect to second-degree price discrimina-
tion, each time with various levels of consumer personalized
segmentation occurring.
Algorithmic personalized pricing as a discriminatory pric-
ing practice needs to be distinguished from “price steering”
and “targeted advertising,” where supplier algorithms will take
into account consumer personal characteristics and in a sense
exercise some form of discrimination, not on the price per se,
but on the order with which product offers are listed or adver-
tised for a specific consumer.19 Algorithmic personalized pric-
ing also needs to be distinguished from “dynamic pricing,”
where prices fluctuate based on offer and demand rather than
by discriminating price offers based on an individual’s per-
sonal characteristics.20 Given the opacity regarding pricing
methods and techniques and the difficulty to detect what may
amount to dynamic pricing or personalized pricing practices,
the line between the two may be blurry at times.21
With respect to these various price discrimination prac-
tices, Ezrachi & Stucke refer to “behavioral discrimination,” ac-
cording to which suppliers exploit known biases about con-
sumers to their advantage, be it consumers’ (lack of) pa-
tience,22 consumers’ cell phone power levels,23 and, more
18. Townley, Morrison & Yeung, supra note 4, at 690.
19. OECD COMPETITION COMMITTEE, supra note 1, at 9–10; see also
EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 4, at 107–08.
20. OECD COMPETITION COMMITTEE, supra note 1, at 9; EZRACHI &
STUCKE, supra note 4, at 87–88.
21. EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 4, at 87–88.
22. Id. at 110–11.
23. Arwa Mahdawi, Is Your Friend Getting a Cheaper Uber Fare Than You Are?,
THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 13, 2018, 12:39 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2018/apr/13/uber-lyft-prices-personalized-data (reporting
that an Uber behavioral economist was making a correlation between users’
willingness to pay more when phone power was diminishing, however not
directly admitting that Uber was using that information to charge higher
prices).
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generally, various forms of online tactics as a means to get
closer to a consumer’s reservation price.24
II.
PERSONAL DATA USED
In the last decades, an entire economy has developed
around the extraction of personal data for the purpose of
perfecting the predictability of consumer behavior—”[d]ata is
the new oil.”25 This massive extraction goes way beyond the
collection of personal data for the purpose of service delivery
and service improvement that directly benefit consumers. This
has been referred to as “behavioral surplus.”26 Initially devel-
oped to improve the quality of targeted advertising and online
advertising revenues,27 the powerful algorithm-enabled data
extraction and predictive analytics continually improve
through machine learning and exponential online traffic. The
end goal of consumer data analytics is to find the optimal
time, location, and manner to intervene or influence, modify
even, consumer behaviors to the benefit of suppliers.28 While
the battle for consumers’ attention in advertising continues,29
this increasingly sophisticated personal data extraction is not
confined to advertisement purposes—it is of direct benefit to
any firm having an interest in purchasing or accessing proba-
bilistic information about consumer behavior.30
In the context of algorithmic personalized pricing, one
person’s entire online digital footprint becomes relevant to as-
24. EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 4, at 101–16.
25. Coined phrase attributed to Clive Humby, UK Mathematician and
architect of Tesco’s Clubcard, 2006. For a critique of this analogy from a
regulatory perspective, see Lauren Henry Scholz, Big Data is Not Big Oil: The
Role of Analogy in the Law of New Technologies, 86 Tenn. L. Rev. 863 (2020).
26. SOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM 8, 63–97
(2019).
27. Id. at 74–82 (describing how, in the early 2000s, Google created new
algorithms protected by patents that tapped into detailed personal data
available through users’ search engine functions to develop a profitable busi-
ness model based on increasing advertising revenues).
28. Id. at 19, 78.
29. See TIM WU, THE ATTENTION MERCHANTS: THE EPIC SCRAMBLE TO GET
INSIDE OUR HEADS 5–7 (2016) (detailing how society has arrived at a point
where every part of our lives is commercialized, through the impressive as-
cension within the last century of the industry of “Attention Merchants”).
30. ZUBOFF, supra note 26, at 96.
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sessing a consumer’s willingness to pay. This footprint includes
commercial transactions, lifestyle, habits, hobbies, prefer-
ences, social networks, and work platforms. All those spheres
are indiscriminately morphed into a large pool of data, grant-
ing access to the most secret corners of consumers’ existence,
unknown even to the customers themselves.31 Under the guise
of convoluted standard terms of use nobody reads but “agrees
to,” and often soft privacy laws with limited regulatory over-
sight, the collection of big data has quickly become one of the
largest forms of extraction with the lowest public regulatory
oversight.32
In a comprehensive study on personalized pricing, an
OECD Competition Committee report listed three categories
of personal data available to or extrapolated by data analytics
intermediaries and suppliers.33 There is (i)”volunteered data”
(name, phone number, email address, date of birth, address
for delivery, responses to surveys, professional occupation,
level of education ) (ii)”observed data” (IP address, operation
system, past purchases, website visits, speed of clicks, user loca-
tion, search history, “likes” in social networks), and (iii) “in-
ferred data” (income, health status, risk profile, responsiveness
to ads, consumer loyalty, political ideology, behavioral bias,
hobbies).34 Relevant to personalized pricing is the reuse of any
31. See, e.g., James Carmichael, Google Knows You Better Than You Know
Yourself, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 19, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/tech-
nology/archive/2014/08/google-knows-you-better-than-you-know-yourself/
378608/; Bar-Gill, supra note 4, at 231 (referring to documented practices by
Facebook and Google utilizing large amounts of data accessible to them to
implement “cognitive” services, which can be either used directly by
Facebook and Google or offered to third parties).
32. FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS
THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 3–4 (2015); MARGARET JANE RADIN,
BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW
19–51 (2013) (describing why we do not read standard terms of use, and the
normative and democratic degradation that ensue from the widespread use
of “boilerplates”); Karlin Lillington, Ban All Indiscriminate Data Gatherings,
IRISH TIMES (Nov. 7, 2019), https://www.irishtimes.com/business/technol-
ogy/karlin-lillington-ban-all-indiscriminate-data-gathering-1.4074670.
33. OECD COMPETITION COMMITTEE, supra note 1, at 11. See also EXEC.




34. OECD COMPETITION COMMITTEE, supra note 1, at 11.
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combination of such personal data that will enable the devel-
opment of a profile of purchasing behavior and power, be it of
returning customers on a dedicated retailer web platform, or
through website visits (through the consumer’s IP address or
cookies gathering a digital trail of a consumer’s online behav-
ior).35 This includes drawing distinctions about price sensitiv-
ity between the “lazy” fidelity consumer who does not shop
around and the active shopper navigating back and forth be-
tween websites.
Much of the personal data which data analytics in-
termediaries and suppliers extract and process to predict and
influence consumer behavior comes from one of three
sources: (1) information made voluntarily available by con-
sumers in specific contexts (i.e. an online purchase); (2) infor-
mation submitted freely and which becomes (semi)-publicly
available (e.g., Facebook “likes”); and (3) information made
available to data analytics firms allegedly allowed through the
obscure terms of service that people tend not to read but seem
to agree to anyways. However, personal data is also collected
specifically through Facebook and the Facebook privacy terms
that allowed this have been alleged to be misleading and de-
ceptive in a complaint by the Federal Trade Commission
against Facebook.36
There exists a huge gap between consumers’ reasonable
expectation of how their personal data will be used and how
such personal data is actually used, by the entity collecting the
data and by third parties. This knowledge gap also illustrates
the lack of control consumers have over the use of their per-
sonal data online. There is often no option to prevent per-
sonal data from being used beyond a specific purpose, other
than by not using the app or social media platform altogether.
Movements toward regaining more control over consumers’
35. Zuiderveen Borgesius & Poort, supra note 4, at 350. See also Townley,
Morrison & Yeung, supra note 4, at 684; Miller, supra note 4, at 49–54.
36. Complaint ¶ 9,23,48, United States v. Facebook, No. 19-cv-2184
(D.D.C. filed July 24, 2019) [hereinafter US Complaint]. Facebook agreed to
pay a fine of US $5 billion and to take various remedial actions in settlement
of US Complaint, having allegedly resorted to misleading and deceptive in-
formation regarding users’ privacy settings. See Settlement Order, United
States v. Facebook, No. 19-cv-2184, 2020 WL 1975785 (D.D.C. Apr. 23, 2020).
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personal data, returning to a decentralized web,37 and regula-
tory responses to that effect such as the EU GDPR38 and Cali-
fornia Consumer Privacy Act of 2018,39 flow directly from this
growing concern.
III.
REQUIRED CONDITIONS FOR ALGORITHMIC PERSONALIZED
PRICING TO OCCUR
International organizations, government offices and agen-
cies, and scholars that have studied algorithmic personalized
pricing closely are prudent on their pronouncement of the ex-
tent to which algorithmic personalized pricing is occurring.40
This guarded approach is puzzling given growing signs of al-
gorithmic personalized pricing practices taking place, while at
the same time, not too surprising. First, algorithmic personal-
ized pricing is difficult to detect. Second, as discussed in this
part, economic theory has traditionally set important precon-
ditions for personalized pricing to occur. However, the rapidly
improving behavioral predictive ability of machine-learning
tools, and the profound mutation of the online marketplace
environment, demand that we revisit traditional economic as-
37. See, e.g., Ruben Verborgh, How We Regain Control of Personal Data: A
Return to a Decentralized Web, TOWARDS DATA SCI. (Aug. 28, 2019), https://
towardsdatascience.com/ruben-verborgh-on-data-privacy-accf91d280c9.
38. Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament on the Protection
and Free Movement of Personal Data on General Data Protection Regula-
tion, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 [hereinafter EU GDPR].
39. California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE
§§1798.100–1798.199 [hereinafter CCPA].
40. See, e.g., OECD Competition Committee, supra note 1, at 14–16; US
PRESIDENT EXECUTIVE OFFICE, supra note 33, at 10–13; EUR. COMM., CON-
SUMER MARKET STUDY ON ONLINE MARKET SEGMENTATION THROUGH PER-
SONALISED PRICING/OFFERS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2018), https://
ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/aid_development_cooperation_funda
mental_rights/aid_and_development_by_topic/documents/synthesis_re
port_online_personalisation_study_final_0.pdf (detailing a study covering
all EU Member States, Iceland and Norway, Dec. 2016 to Nov. 2017, point-
ing to evidence of personalized offers (i.e. selected advertising) but not of
personalized pricing per se); Zuiderveen Borgesius & Poort, supra note 4, at
348–50; Wagner & Eidenmüller, supra note 4, at 586 (pointing to a lack of
empirical evidence about algorithmic personalized pricing (first degree
priced discrimination), but also to several incentives for the practice which
may indicate the practice will increase in the future).
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sumptions about personalized pricing and the extent to which
the practice may be taking place.41
Customer anecdotes, reports, and empirical studies show
signs of algorithmic personalized pricing taking place—Ama-
zon selling products to regular customers at higher prices than
to others, Uber charging different rates for the same route at
the same time of day, businesses’ self-declared practices (e.g.,
airline companies personalizing baggage fees to increase prof-
its), or brick and mortar stores personalizing price offerings to
in-store consumers by scanning their cellphones,42 and are
well-documented by business and economic literature.43 Spe-
cific empirical studies point to personalized pricing taking
place.44 The emergence of intermediaries collecting and sell-
41. Khan, infra note 90, 763–64 (on Amazon’s ability to practice person-
alized pricing, including first-degree price discrimination).
42. Bar-Gill, supra note 4, at 218 (referring to British company B&Q, hav-
ing tested in its stores price tags that interface with customers’ phones and
adjust display prices based on consumers’ loyalty data and spending trends).
43. EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 4, at 89–94; OECD COMPETITION COM-
MITTEE, supra note 1, at 16. The latter summarizes recent consumer report-
ing of experiences of personalized pricing, often negated by suppliers, docu-
mented in the literature: Amazon selling products to regular consumers at
higher prices uncovered by deleting cookies on computer to cause drop in
those prices; ZipRecruiter’s (an online employment recruiter) 2015 experi-
ment with algorithmic pricing based on customer data which resulted in
85% profit increase; online platform Coupons.com reporting in 2016 on use
of proprietary data on consumer behavior to target digital coupons to con-
sumers; airline AirAsia Bhd testing in 2017 personalized baggage pricing to
increase revenues, using big data and AI tools to better understand what
passengers were prepared to pay; consumers reporting in 2018 that Uber
charges different prices for rides involving the same route at the same time
of day. See also Bar-Gill, supra note 4, at 225–26 (citing study that showed that
Apple iOS and Safari users are occasionally shown higher prices for the same
product).
44. See, e.g., Aniko Hannak et al., Measuring Price Discrimination and
Steering on E-Commerce Websites, Paper Delivered at the 2014 Internet
Measurement Conference (Nov. 5–7, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/
files/documents/public_comments/2015/09/00011-97593.pdf (detailing
an empirical study of 300 consumers visiting 16 popular websites, and also
creating fake accounts to track different patterns, pointing to evidence of
personalized pricing); OECD COMPETITION COMMITTEE, supra note 1, at
14–16 (referring to a survey by Deloitte that involved over 500 companies, a
consumer survey of the European Commission, a 2012 Wall Street Journal
investigation, and a 2012 The New York Times investigation). See also
DELOITTE DIG. & SALESFORCE, CONSUMER EXPERIENCE IN THE RETAIL RENAIS-
SANCE: HOW LEADING BRANDS BUILD A BEDROCK WITH DATA 11 (2018), http:/
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ing data with the express purpose of identifying customers’
willingness to pay is an important indicator that personalized
pricing is likely on the rise.45
Economic literature traditionally refers to the existence of
three conditions for personalized pricing to take place: (i) the
ability to assess consumers’ individual willingness to pay; (ii)
consumers’ limited capability of performing arbitrage; and
(iii) the presence of market power.46 Added to these three
preconditions is (iv) the ability to counter consumers’ possible
negative perception of personalized pricing by concealing this
commercial practice. This part assesses briefly each of those
preconditions and queries the extent to which those require-
ments may need to be revisited for current e-commerce prac-
tices, personal data, and algorithms.
A. Ability to Assess Consumers’ Individual Willingness to Pay
For personalized pricing to yield positive results, suppliers
need to have access to accurate data that allows them to pre-
dict within a reasonable range consumers’ willingness to pay.47
This criterion is often raised as an important barrier to person-
alized pricing effectively taking place. Access to a vast amount
of personalized data does not guarantee the ability to deter-
mine with accuracy a consumer’s reservation price. Many ele-
ments, including consumer preferences that may interfere
/dmi-org.com/downloads/2018_03_consumer-experience-in-the-retail-ren-
aissance.pdf.
45. Bar-Gill, supra note 4, at 218–19 (citing recent study findings that
retailers and travel sites set prices that vary by hundreds of dollars between
consumers; and referring to intermediaries gathering and selling informa-
tion to retailers about consumers’ willingness to pay, thus enabling personal-
ized pricing); id. at 226–27 (referring to Optimal Decisions Group, which
conducted research on consumers’ willingness to pay and sold research and
profit-maximizing pricing models to insurers; and to companies such as
Freshplum and TellApart selling similar big data analytics business solu-
tions).
46. OECD DIRECTORATE FOR FIN. & ENTER. AFF. COMPETITION COMM.,
PERSONALIZED PRICING IN THE DIGITAL ERA – NOTE BY THE EUROPEAN UNION
4–5 (2018), https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2018)128/
en/pdf [hereinafter OECD EU SUBMISSION].
47. OECD COMPETITION COMMITTEE, supra note 1, at 10–12 (enumerat-
ing and discussing the steps firms need to follow to implement personalized
pricing).
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with the decision to buy, are hard to measure and predict.48
The ability to generate and apply accurate data has made com-
mentators skeptical about “perfect, first-degree” algorithmic
personalized pricing being possible in the near future.49
As we have seen earlier, the quality of predictive analytics
tools is continually improving through machine learning and
the volume of data collected and processed.50 The end goal of
the behavioral futures market products and economy is to remove
uncertainty as much as possible in predicting human behav-
ior.51 While earlier skepticism about data prediction tool capa-
bilities may have been legitimate, it seems less and less justified
given the rapidly evolving and growing data extraction econ-
omy. A failure to acknowledge and closely monitor the effects
of this change and the concerns they raise about the use of
consumers’ personal data will be at the peril of regulators and
enforcement bodies.
B. The Absence of or Limited Arbitrage
Another condition invariably invoked for personalized
pricing to be attractive for suppliers is the limited ability of
consumers to resell goods or services acquired from suppliers,
which would create a market that competes with the suppliers’
market.52 Arbitrage is typically not possible with respect to ser-
vice contracts that are not transferrable, e.g., flight tickets, ho-
tel accommodations, or online subscriptions to film or mu-
sic.53 It is more likely to take place with respect to durable
goods and conversely less so with fungible goods.54 This com-
mon assumption of limited arbitrage might need to be recon-
48. EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 4, at 96–99 (pointing to a multiplicity
of factors affecting price decisions in spite of the accuracy of the personal-
ized data at hand, given a lack of predictability, (ir)rationality, insufficiency
of sample size, and the fact that the algorithm may not have had enough
trial and error opportunities available to accurately determine what variables
were needed to calculate reservation prices); Bar-Gill, supra note 4, at
228–29.
49. EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 4, at 96–100.
50. See supra Part II.
51. ZUBOFF, supra note 26, at 19, 78.
52. EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 4, at 86–87; OECD COMPETITION COM-
MITTEE, supra note 1, at 13; Wagner & Eidenmüller, supra note 4, at 585–86;
Bar-Gill, supra note 4, at 227.
53. OECD COMPETITION COMMITTEE, supra note 1, at 13.
54. Id.
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sidered in the era of increasingly sophisticated algorithms that
adjust price offerings. Personalized pricing can occur in subtle
incremental or concealed ways that may not necessarily trigger
the appetite for resale en bloc in a way that would compete
with the suppliers’ first sales. Also, the ability for buyers to de-
termine alternate competitive prices may be diminished in the
context of increasingly complex price offerings. This increased
complexity to identify competing offerings may expand the ab-
sence of arbitrage beyond the traditional scenarios of non-
transferable contracts and fungible goods. This in turn creates
auspicious conditions for personalized pricing to occur with
respect to a broader range of goods and services.
C. Presence of Market Power
Conventional economics’ wisdom requires the supplier to
have some market power for personalized pricing to be a via-
ble proposition.55 As tempting as it may be to get as close as
possible to a consumer’s willingness to pay, suppliers do not
want to lose sales by pricing their goods or services too high.
Traditional economic theory dictates that a competitive
market will auto-regulate such practices.56 In a perfectly com-
petitive market, prices tend to go down to marginal cost for all
consumers,57 which in theory makes personalized pricing im-
possible.
Market power can be exercised through a variety of
means including economies of scale and incentives to remain
with one supplier that arise through fidelity programs as well
as entry and switching costs.58 Market power  can also be exer-
cised through network effects which include consumers be-
coming “captive” to a service or product or large scale social-
55. Townley, Morrison & Yeung, supra note 4, at 691–92 (surveying eco-
nomic literature on the likely presence and effects of personalized pricing in
monopoly markets as opposed to competitive markets where personalized
pricing is unlikely).
56. OECD COMPETITION COMMITTEE, supra note 1, at 11; see also OECD,
DIRECTORATE FIN. & ENTER. AFF. COMPETITION COMM., PRICE DISCRIMINATION
– BACKGROUND NOTE FROM THE SECRETARIAT 9, 32–33 (2016), https://
one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP(2016)15/en/pdf [hereinafter OECD
COMPETITION COMMITTEE 2016]; Wagner & Eidenmüller, supra note 5, at
585–86.
57. OECD COMPETITION COMMITTEE, supra note 1, at 13.
58. Id. at 14.
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media platform, for fear of losing the appeal of its wide users’
network; the platform operator market power expanding
thereby accordingly. Additionally, large retailer platforms also
exhibit market power due to the promise of efficiency through
reduced search costs, a developed relationship of trust be-
tween consumers and suppliers about competitive prices, and
the comfort and convenience of an established account, which
may take precedence over the vigilance required and expected
of shoppers. Suppliers need not be in a position of monopoly
per se and personalized pricing may occur in (imperfectly)
competitive markets.59
D. Concealed Personalized Pricing
In addition to the above three frequently cited require-
ments, the ability to conceal the occurrence of personalized
pricing is another precondition for suppliers to have recourse
to this practice.60 Consumers are generally averse to personal-
ized pricing and view it as being unfair.61 Suppliers have little
interest in augmenting their profit base by nearing individual
consumers’ willingness to pay if it is at the risk of upsetting
their whole consumer base.62
The detection of personalized pricing is complex, as data
processing and algorithms become more sophisticated and
powerful, allowing various permutations, intertwined with
practices other than personalized pricing, such as dynamic
pricing.63 For instance, personalized pricing is much less dis-
59. Miller, supra note 4, at 54, 57; Odlyzko, supra note 6, at 358 (on rec-
ognition in economic literature that price discrimination can arise in a com-
petitive environment).
60. Bar-Gill, supra note 4, at 227–28 (arguing that personalized pricing
may be more likely to occur where points of comparison between products
are more difficult given variances or options between similar products or
where it is more difficult to have access to what other consumers are paying
for same product).
61. See infra Part IV.
62. See, e.g., Andrew Odlyzko, Network Neutrality, Search Neutrality, and the
Never-Ending Conflict Between Efficiency and Fairness in Markets, 8 REV. NETWORK
ECON. 40, 49–50 (2009).
63. See Hannak et al., supra note 44. Refer to “Introduction” about the
various obstacles, substantive and technical, to conducting a proper study to
determine the existence of personalized pricing. See also Khan, infra note 90,
at 763–64; OECD COMPETITION COMMITTEE, supra note 1, at 14; see supra Part
I for further discussion on dynamic pricing.
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cernible when it can be intertwined with dynamic pricing
based on real time offers and demands, as is the case in the
online airline ticket market, or the hotel industry.
Even for more overt instances of price discrimination—
e.g., asking a different price for consumers who pay by cash or
by credit card—suppliers will tend to frame their price offer-
ing in a positive way such as “discount if paying by cash,” as
opposed to “higher price if paying by credit card.”64 Other fac-
tors that may explain the relative opacity of personalized pric-
ing are the sensitivity surrounding pricing structures gener-
ally—and more specifically to guard against claims of collusion
with competitors.
As Frank Pasquale explains in The Black Box Society,65 the
lack of transparency regarding the handling of personal data
has been a defining feature of e-commerce and the digital
economy.66 The likely inclination for suppliers to conceal the
practice of personalized pricing has important ramifications
on the proper path to regulating less detectable practices.67
In sum, the rapidly improving quality of behavioral pre-
dictive algorithmic tools, enabling more effective and targeted
personalized pricing, the relative ease with which this commer-
cial practice may be concealed, and the difficulty for consum-
ers to discern competitive alternatives through pricing and ad-
vertising schemes bring new light to the traditional required
factors for personalized pricing to take place, i.e. assessing the
consumer’s willingness to pay, limited arbitrage, and the pres-
ence of market power.
64. EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 4, at 111 (referring to this practice as
the “framing effect” to attenuate any negative perception of unfairness).
65. PASQUALE, supra note 32.
66. Id. at 3 (“The law, so aggressively protective of secrecy in the world of
commerce, is increasingly silent when it comes to the privacy of persons”);
ZUBOFF, supra note 26, at 338–45 (listing several factors explaining how “sur-
veillance capitalists” have been able to get away for so long with concealing
personal data handling practices from their consumers and the public;
among them, consumers’ self-interest, social persuasion, inevitabilism, igno-
rance, and unprecedented, i.e. sui generis environment, logic and methods
that were initially impossible to comprehend).
67. See infra Part VI.
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IV.
CONSUMERS’ LEVEL OF ACCEPTANCE OF PERSONALIZED PRICING
Available consumer surveys indicate a strong consumer
dislike of discriminatory pricing. In one survey of 1500 Ameri-
can households published in 2005, 91% of respondents were
strongly against retailers charging different prices for the same
product based on the collection of personal information.68 In
another survey conducted by the EU Commission in 2018 with
more than 20,000 consumers, only around 8% of consumers
viewed such practices as beneficial and the percentage of con-
sumers who were strongly opposed (around 33%) was lower
than in the American study, with a large percentage being
neutral or not knowing the answer.69 When specific suppliers’
personalized pricing practices are brought to light, suppliers
are usually swift to claim system mistakes or a mere trial period
and declare an end to the practice altogether.70 As a result of
consumers’ general disapproval of discriminatory pricing due
to their perception of it being unfair,71 retailers will either re-
frain from the practice or do it secretively.72
68. See Joseph Turrow et al., Open to Exploration: America’s Shoppers Online
and Offline, Penn Libraries 35 (June 1, 2005) https://repository.upenn.edu/
asc_papers/35; OECD COMPETITION COMMITTEE, supra note 1, at 24.
69. EUR. COMM., CONSUMER MARKET STUDY ON ONLINE MARKET SEGMEN-




TION COMMITTEE, supra note 1, at 24–25.
70. Kate Abnett, Will Personalized Pricing Take E-Commerce Back to the Ba-
zaar?, BUS. OF FASHION (Mar. 20, 2015), https://www.businessoffashion.
com/articles/fashion-tech/personalised-pricing-turns-e-commerce-online-ba
zaar (“Amazon was found to be charging its regular consumers higher prices
for some products, after one shopper deleted the cookies on his computer
that identified him as a regular Amazon customer and saw the price of a
DVD drop.”).
71. UK OFF. OF FAIR TRADING, ONLINE TARGETING OF ADVERTISING AND
PRICES: A MARKET STUDY 48 (2010); US PRESIDENT EXECUTIVE OFFICE, supra
note 33, at 13; OECD COMPETITION COMMITTEE, supra note 1, at 14; Joost
Poort & Frederik J. Zuiderveen Borgesius, Does everyone have a price? Under-
standing people’s attitude towards online and offline price discrimination, 8 IN-
TERNET POL’Y REV., 1 (2019) http://dx.doi.org/10.14763/2019.1.1383 (anal-
ysis of two surveys conducted in the Netherlands, whereby vast majority of
consumers viewed practice of online price discrimination unfair).
72. See supra Part III (the ability to conceal the practice of algorithmic
personalized pricing is one pre-condition for its occurrence).
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To what extent should consumer surveys inform law and
policy? As informative and reliable as surveys may be, they
should not detract from a principled approach, by law and pol-
icy makers, to the challenges posed by the exponential
proliferation of use of personal data in e-commerce, or any
other field for that matter. For instance, consumers’ embrace
of the convenience of apps using vast amounts of personal
data should not justify law and policy actors’ inaction if there
are valid concerns to intervene, e.g. exploitation. At the same
time, consumers’ dislike of a commercial practice such as per-
sonalized pricing, merits further investigation. What lies be-
neath the marked dislike in discriminatory pricing, particu-
larly when resorting to personal information, is what should be
explored further in identifying potential concerns with this
commercial practice and better articulating the reasons be-
hind such discomfort.
V.
NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS AROUND ALGORITHMIC
PERSONALIZED PRICING
What are the reasons behind an innate aversion to al-
gorithmic personalized pricing? After all, various forms of dis-
criminatory pricing have been around for some time and are
commonplace. The common assumption is that save for pre-
datory pricing and other anti-competitive, deceptive, or anti-
discrimination law practices, suppliers should be free to sell
products at whatever price they decide, so long as the price is
disclosed unequivocally to consumers. Consumers will do their
research about comparable products and can choose to walk
away from the transaction if the price is above their willingness
to pay. Suppliers’ primary incentive is to make sales; market
forces will keep them in line by ensuring that prices remain
competitive, as the conventional narrative goes.73 The above
assumptions are increasingly under attack and scrutinized in
ways that are particularly relevant to our discussion on the ac-
ceptability of personalized pricing. The increased concentra-
73. See, e.g., COMPETITION BUREAU CAN., BIG DATA AND INNOVATION: KEY
THEMES FOR COMPETITION POLICY IN CANADA 5 (2018), https://
www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/04342.html (“Com-
petition law and policy should continue to rely on market forces to lead to
beneficial outcomes, not regulate prices or other outcomes.”).
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tion of market power with products delivered through large
internet platforms makes “first degree or perfect price discrim-
ination” more likely.74 As discussed earlier, the prevalent on-
line practice of “versioning” makes it harder and more labor
intensive for consumers to ascertain competitive prices for
comparable products.75 Documented misleading commercial
practices of “dark patterns” create confusion and incite hasti-
ness in purchasing decisions that should be taken into account
in our discussion on the acceptability of personalized pric-
ing.76 Last but not least and central to the present discussion,
the power to significantly influence consumers’ decisions
through the use of their personal data skews asymmetries be-
tween buyer and seller in favor of the latter even more than
has ever been the case. In the context of personalized pricing,
this may involve third degree forms of “behavioral discrimina-
tion”77 to first degree starker individualized forms of price dis-
crimination. It is in the context of the power beneath massive
use of personal data and shifting assumptions around market
forces that the acceptability of algorithmic personalized pric-
ing needs to be reconsidered.
A. Discursive Prevailing Norms
Questions about the adequacy of algorithmic personal-
ized pricing tend to be addressed predominantly on the basis
of economic considerations and the effects algorithmic per-
sonalized pricing may have on competition and market effi-
ciency. Other considerations revolve around values of equality,
fairness, trust, privacy, autonomy, and transparency. While
these different sets of considerations (i.e. economic-based and
value-based) are not completely distinct from each other (e.g.,
maintaining trust in the marketplace is also an underlying
value of competition law and policy), in some important ways
74. See supra Part I.
75. See id.
76. See generally Jamie Luguri & Lio Strahilevitz, Shining a Light on Dark
Patterns (Univ. of Chi. Pub. Law., Working Paper No. 719, 2019) (describing
deceptive online practices, e.g., inciting consumers to provide personal infor-
mation they would otherwise not agree to supply, and conducting empirical
research on the possible effectiveness of such tactics); Deceptive Experiences
to Online Users Reduction (DETOUR) Act, § 1084 116th Cong. (2019) (in-
troduced to deal with phenomenon of “dark patterns”).
77. EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 4, at 110–11. See supra Part I.
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they are different. While evaluating the competitive effects of a
commercial practice tends to focus on the economic efficiency
of free and open markets as an underlying objective or core
premise, values of equality and fairness tend to focus on ques-
tions of discrimination, social justice, consumer perceptions
and protection,78 and on issues where the harm may be more
diffuse, through potential collective and longer-term harm,
such as progressive normative degradation that may be occa-
sioned by important shifts in commercial practices. This part
will provide an overview of normative considerations guided by
economic, antitrust, and competition perspectives, followed by
considerations that revolve around the core values of equality,
fairness, privacy, transparency, and autonomy.
B. Freedom, Market Efficiency, Competition, and Innovation
In liberal free-market democracies, there is an underlying
assumption that suppliers are free to set prices as they see fit
for the products they sell. Supplier freedom in pricing prac-
tices expresses “the belief that the value of goods is deter-
mined solely by the transacting parties’ subjective judgment of
the utility of the goods to them.”79 The golden rule of fair mar-
ket value leaves it to what the buyer agrees to pay and the sup-
plier agrees to sell for as the benchmark. The notion of pric-
ing freedom relies heavily on contracting parties’ autonomy
and, in mass market transactions, on competitive markets as
the gatekeepers that steer prices toward the lower end.
Pricing freedom explicitly rejects “ ‘just price’ theories,”
which Miller traces back as far as Roman and medieval law,
under which “goods have an independent and objective fair
price.”80 Some concept of a “just price” subsists in some in-
stances, as we are reminded amid the COVID-19 pandemic or
78. See Townley, Morrison & Yeung, supra note 4, at 744–48 (drawing
conclusions on effects of algorithmic consumer price discrimination after
having conducted an extensive analysis on the legal issues surrounding per-
sonalized pricing through the lens of two distinct norms: economic effi-
ciency and fairness or justice, which the authors describe as encompassing
consumers’ subjective perceptions, and regarding unfairness to social
groups).
79. Miller, supra note 4, at 68.
80. Id. at 68, 75–76.
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natural disasters, by the existing social norms and laws that
ban price gouging and other exorbitant pricing tactics.81
Supplier freedom is a default rule and core value that un-
derpins the regulation of pricing practices.82 A priori, the sup-
plier freedom assumption entails the ability to practice price
discrimination if firms so decide, subject to such practices vio-
lating antidiscrimination, human rights, and antitrust laws.83
Unrestrained pricing freedom and its heavy reliance on auton-
omy and market efficiency is more justified with respect to ne-
gotiated transactions and particularly with respect to sales of
unique objects or property. Unrestricted supplier freedom as
the base norm is less justified in online mass market consumer
transactions where both consumer autonomy and market effi-
ciency are compromised. Suppliers’ increasingly powerful
tools and use of personal data influence online consumer
purchasing decisions. This is especially true in “micro-market-
place chambers,” where consumers’ judgement of competitive
alternatives in the marketplace are blurred.84 In that context,
there may be merit in reconsidering some boundaries to a
“just price” as gravitation points and counterweights to increas-
ing asymmetry of information and power between suppliers
and consumers.
Most commentators on personalized pricing are guarded
about its possible positive or negative effects on competition.85
81. Jack Nicas, He Has 17,000 Bottles of Hand Sanitzer and Nowhere to Sell
Them, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/14/
technology/coronavirus-purell-wipes-amazon-sellers.html?auth=login-
facebook (discussing Amazon cracking down on price gouging).
82. See Miller, supra note 4, at 68 (“[T]he liberal tradition . . . places a
greater burden of persuasion on the shoulders of those who would advocate
rules to regulate free markets.”).
83. For example, if price discrimination amounts to abuse of market
power (also referred to as abuse of a dominant position), it is related to
predatory pricing, or price fixing practices.
84. The author refers to “micro-marketplace chambers” by analogy to the
phenomenon of “echo chambers,” whereby tailored online business prac-
tices may create or reinforce false perceptions by consumers about relevant
markets. See also EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 4, at 108–09 (on how firms
intentionally make price and other offerings more complex, increasing
search and switching costs, and lowering effective competition).
85. See, e.g., Zuiderveen Borgesius & Poort, supra note 4, at 353–54 (cal-
culating overall economic welfare by adding consumer surplus to supplier
profits and by comparing its value under various scenarios with or without
price discrimination in a monopolist market); Wagner & Eidenmüller, supra
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Aside from cases where the practice would amount to abuse of
a dominant position or be connected to price collusion or car-
tels, there is no consensus about whether personalized pricing
has positive effects on competition.86 What adds an additional
layer of complexity to that assessment, and often fails to be
acknowledged in the economic and legal literature on person-
alized pricing, is that views diverge on the end goals of compe-
tition law and policy. The determination of the
(anti)competitive effects of a commercial practice, including
algorithmic personalized pricing, depends in great part on the
standards applied to determine an increase or decrease in
competition. Are the (anti)competitive effects of a commercial
practice determined by the effect of the practice on consumer
welfare, the prevailing standard in the United States?87 If so,
note 4, at 587–88; OECD COMPETITION COMMITTEE, supra note 1, at 20 (not-
ing that personalized pricing is likely to be more harmful to consumers in
noncompetitive markets and could increase competition in competitive mar-
kets); DIRECTORATE FOR FIN. & ENTER. AFFS. COMPETITION COMM., OECD,
PERSONALISED PRICING IN THE DIGITAL ERA – NOTE BY THE UNITED STATES 4
(Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/us-submis-
sions-oecd-2010-present-other-international-competition-fora/personal-
ized_pricing_note_by_the_united_states.pdf [hereinafter OECD U.S. SUB-
MISSION] (positing that the overall welfare effects of second- and third-de-
gree price discrimination are unclear, and that perfect first-degree price
discrimination would unambiguously increase total welfare; however, in mo-
nopolies, first-degree price discrimination would extract all consumer sur-
plus, leaving some consumers worse off than under uniform pricing); DIREC-
TORATE FOR FIN. & ENTER. AFFS. COMPETITION COMM., OECD, PERSONALIZED
PRICING IN THE DIGITAL ERA – NOTE BY BEUC, 2 (Nov. 28, 2018), https://
one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2018)129/en/pdf [hereinafter
OECD BEUC SUBMISSION] (alleging that increased market efficiency
through discriminatory pricing ignores that consumers’ willingness to pay
can be manipulated through use of deceptive practices, reducing consumer
surplus significantly).
86. See infra notes 94–107.
87. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust in 2018: The Meaning of
Consumer Welfare Now, 6 PENN WHARTON PUB. POL’Y INITIATIVE, Issue Brief 8
(2018) (positing that in light of recent debate in U.S. antitrust policy on its
core objectives, the consumer welfare principle has been and should remain
the cardinal rule of antitrust policy, with some minor updates proposed by
the author); Steven C. Salop, Question: What Is the Real and Proper Antitrust
Welfare Standard? Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard, 22 LOY. CON-
SUMER L. REV. 336 (2010); Russell Pittman, Consumer Surplus as the Appropriate
Standard for Antitrust Enforcement, 3 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 205 (2007);
Miller, supra note 4, at 70–71.
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how do we define consumer welfare?88 Or should the proper
standard be the effect of a practice on overall economic or
social welfare?89 And if so, how do we define and assess in-
creased social welfare?90 Alternatively, should we leave behind
the concept of increased welfare as a standard due to its vague-
ness and difficulty of measurement, and focus on the process
of ensuring competitive markets91—with the hope that an-
ticompetitive practices may be addressed sooner and more ef-
fectively?92
88. See Hovenkamp, supra note 87, at 1 (defining consumer welfare prin-
ciple as “the proposition that anti-trust policy should encourage markets to
produce two things for the benefit of consumers: (1) output that is as high
as is consistent with sustainable competition, and (2) prices that are accord-
ingly as low”).
89. See Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Con-
sumer Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020 (1987);
EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 4, at 203 (on the ultimate end goals of anti-
trust and competition law enforcement being about the promotion of flour-
ishing innovation and investment while minimizing harms); Hovenkamp,
supra note 87, at 3 (pointing out that a general welfare test balances con-
sumer harm against producer benefits and that its application can lead to
accepting a significant amount of market power as not being anticompeti-
tive).
90. See Lina Khan, Amazon Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 743 (2017)
(arguing against consumer welfare as the standard for evaluating procompe-
titive effects, looking at U.S. Congress’s legislative intent having been histori-
cally against extreme concentrations of market power and as having a variety
of aims “including: the preservation of open markets, the protection of pro-
ducers and consumers from monopoly abuse, and the dispersion of political
and economic control”).
91. See id. at 737–38, 744 (positing that competition law and policy
should promote competitive markets, not welfare, and that focusing atten-
tion on process and structure would be more aligned with the legislative
history of the main U.S. antitrust laws and allow regulators to intervene
sooner than when focusing on high prices and low outputs as indicators of
anticompetitive effects); Tim Wu, After Consumer Welfare, Now What? The Pro-
tection of Competition’ Standard in Practice 9 (Competition Policy Int’l, Colum-
bia Pub. Law Research Paper No. 14-608, 2018), https://scholar-
ship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2291 (positing that law enforc-
ers should ask, “is the complained-of conduct (or merger) merely part of the
competitive process, or is it meant to ‘suppress or even destroy competi-
tion?’” rather than rely on more abstract concepts of increasing wealth or
welfare).
92. See Khan, supra note 90, at 739 (noting that, even by applying the
standard of increased consumer welfare, U.S. antitrust law has failed to
maintain low prices for consumers).
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Diverging views about the desired outcomes that competi-
tion law and policy should aim for are indicative of the per-
ceived inadequacy of competition and antitrust laws to prop-
erly address increased and sustained market dominance of gi-
ant web platforms and search engines. This malaise goes way
beyond the confines of competition law and policy (e.g., tax
law, regulation of damaging content including fake news,
copyright infringement, and freedom of expression).
Whatever standard(s) or process(es) may be better suited
to identify and address anticompetitive practices, they will fail
to adequately evaluate the (anti) competitive effects of al-
gorithmic personalized pricing if such standards do not factor
in the use and control of data, and how such data use and
control affect bargaining power in consumer transactions and
between firms.93
With this important caveat in mind about diverging views
on the end goal of competition law and policy, below are some
of the effects that personalized pricing may have on competi-
tion. In perfect monopoly markets, discriminatory pricing will
be detrimental to consumers by lowering consumer surplus,
but the effects are less clear in imperfect competitive mar-
kets.94 Policy reports generally favorable to the competitive ef-
fects of personalized pricing will also point to potential detri-
mental effects and invite competition agencies to vigilance.95
In the instances where personalized pricing might increase ec-
onomic welfare by reaching out to more consumers that would
otherwise not pay for a good or service at a uniform price that
93. See id. at 745–46 (providing factors to consider if we focus on the
competitive process and openness of the market rather than on consumer
welfare: “(1) entry barriers, (2) conflicts of interest, (3) the emergence of
gatekeepers or bottlenecks, (4) the use of and control over data, and (5) the
dynamics of bargaining power”).
94. See Townley, Morrison & Yeung, supra note 4, at 702. But see OECD
U.S. SUBMISSION, supra note 85.
95. See OECD COMPETITION COMMITTEE 2016, supra note 56, at 36–37
(noting that price discrimination is generally positive for the economy and
pointing out that it will often benefit consumers through an increase in
trade and by pressing firms to compete, and that this should be the baseline
of policymakers’ approach to discriminatory pricing. The report also points
to possible pitfalls of increasing (or abusing) dominance in the marketplace
that policy agencies should be wary of—e.g., partitioning strategies, price
discrimination between intermediate purchases, and exclusionary price dis-
crimination to exclude rivals).
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is too high, and increase suppliers’ profits, it could also lead to
an increase in market power, making entry for new competi-
tors more difficult.96 Even when personalized pricing does not
lead to increased market power through suppliers’ greater
market reach, it would nevertheless tend to reduce consumer
surplus while increasing producer surplus.97 Assertions of
overall increased economic welfare require scrutiny: should
that include scenarios of increased business welfare at the ex-
pense of the resulting decreased consumer welfare?98
The case remains to be made that price discrimination
has positive distributive effects among lower and higher buy-
ers’ purchasing power, allowing the former greater access by
paying less through the latter paying more.99 From the stand-
point that suppliers aim for greater proximity to consumers’
96. See Zuiderveen Borgesius & Poort, supra note 4, at 354 (noting that
price discrimination is advantageous for suppliers in markets with high fixed
costs and low marginal costs, allowing suppliers to recoup their fixed costs
without incurring important dead-weight-losses). On possible benefits and
negative effects of personalized pricing, see EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 4,
at 118–19; see also Rosa-Branca Esteves & Joana Resende, Personalized Pricing
and Advertising: Who Are the Winners?, 63 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 239, 243 (2019)
(observing that, while it is hard to predict welfare effects of the combined
practices of targeted personalized advertising and personalized pricing, if
welfare goes up, it would generally be to the benefit of suppliers and the
detriment of consumers compared to mass advertising and mass pricing).
97. See Zuiderveen Borgesius & Poort, supra note 4, at 355 (noting that
this trend could even increase with more sophisticated personalized pricing
practices getting closer to first-degree discriminatory pricing); OECD EU
SUBMISSION, supra note 46, at 5 (observing that personalized pricing is likely
to be more negative to consumers overall and especially with respect to first-
degree price discrimination, on the basis of an output-expansion effect
(procompetitive effect) combined with a wealth-transfer effect (anticompeti-
tive effect), the latter being likely to be more pronounced).
98. See Miller, supra note 4, at 69 (“Practices that increase overall social
welfare but harm most consumers raise serious ethical concerns. Accepting
the contrary would mean preferring the welfare of business enterprises to
the welfare of the consumer masses, a position that is hard to defend”).
99. See OECD COMPETITION COMMITTEE, supra note 1, at 20 (UK submis-
sion pointing to mixed empirical evidence about the impact of traditional
price discrimination on surplus distribution among consumers and produc-
ers, and citing various studies to that effect); OECD EU SUBMISSION, supra
note 46, at 5–6; DIRECTORATE FOR FIN. & ENTER. AFFAIRS COMPETITION
COMM., OECD, PERSONALISED PRICING IN THE DIGITAL ERA - SUMMARIES OF
CONTRIBUTIONS 4 (Nov. 27, 2018) https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/
COMP/WD(2018)146/en/pdf [hereinafter OECD SUMMARIES OF CONTRIBU-
TIONS] (BEUC submission).
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reservation price through personalized pricing, the more
likely scenario is that all consumers will pay more, with no pos-
itive distributive considerations or effects between the more
and less affluent in mind.
Some argue that personalized pricing practices may have
a positive effect on competition by making price fixing or col-
lusion more difficult among suppliers, especially when such
practices are not easily detectable by competitors (such as se-
cret discounts).100 However, this argument can be tempered
with the caveat that competing firms using similar personal-
ized pricing algorithms could still give rise to pricing trends
with similar types of variation ranges in the marketplace. This
phenomenon, referred to as “conscious parallelism,” may neg-
atively impact competition, however, and, depending on the
jurisdiction, may fall short of amounting to prohibited collu-
sion practices.101
Commentators also raise increased supplier innovation as
one possible positive effect of personalized pricing— by poten-
tially increasing supplier surplus, personalized pricing may
lead toward increased supplier innovation in their products
that will in turn benefit consumers.102 The possible correlation
between personalized pricing and increased innovation seems
somewhat hypothetical and at the mercy of suppliers’ choice
and discretion in how they would use their increased surplus.
In fact, the contrary argument may be made: putting in place
personalized pricing schemes can be costly to suppliers and
can take away precious funds from investment in product in-
novation.103 Moreover, the cost of implementing complex
marketing practices may end up being borne by consumers,
leaving them with no additional benefits and creating a loss by
progressively eating away at consumer surplus.104 To the ex-
tent that suppliers resort to behavioral discrimination prac-
tices, the loss to consumers may be even greater—for example,
100. See OECD COMPETITION COMMITTEE, supra note 1, at 21.
101. See COMPETITION BUREAU CAN., supra note 73, at 10.
102. See OECD COMPETITION COMMITTEE, supra note 1, at 21; EZRACHI &
STUCKE, supra note 4, at 118.
103. See Miller, supra note 4, at 66 (“Instead of competing over better qual-
ity, more variety, or cost reduction, firms compete over adoption of market-
ing tools that do not enhance consumer welfare in any meaningful way, and
may even be socially detrimental.”).
104. See id.; EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 4, at 121.
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by insidiously incenting consumers to purchase more products
they do not need through the creation of false need percep-
tions that further decrease consumer surplus.105
Consumers’ response to this new supplier “innovation” in
the form of a personalized pricing marketing scheme may lead
them to fight back with innovations to protect their anonymity
(or any relevant data to assess their purchasing power), lead-
ing to an “arms race” from which no net gains will result. This
would create more negative externalities in the sense that it
would lead to investing in “non-welfare-enhancing competitive
technologies.”106 From that standpoint, the technologically
savvy and educated consumers would be less likely to be
harmed by algorithmic personalized pricing by “beating sup-
pliers at their own game.” Are these the consumers we should
reward? At what cost for them? How counterproductive would
it be to the overall expectation of increased efficiency in the
online marketplace?
In sum, a review of recent economic and legal literature
suggests that, at best, algorithmic personalized pricing has
neutral competitive effects with a likelihood of decrease in
consumer welfare. If consumer welfare is determined prima-
rily from the standpoint of ensuring the lowest possible price
to consumers, the practice of personalized pricing, which
seeks to get as close as possible to consumers’ reservation
price, would decrease consumer welfare, unless it can be
demonstrated that the price increase is counterweighted by
greater output. To the extent that consumer welfare is the
standard by which the (anti) competitive effects of a practice
are measured, then personalized pricing would have anticom-
petitive effects.107
Even if a cogent argument could be made that personal-
ized pricing increases competition by other measures, such as
overall increase of social or economic welfare, personalized
pricing still needs to be assessed from a fair commercial prac-
tice standpoint, unless one is willing to accept that increased
social or economic welfare should be encouraged even when
105. EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 4, at 119–21. See generally Bar-Gill, supra
note 4.
106. Miller, supra note 4, at 67; Wagner & Eidenmüller, supra note 4, at
587.
107. See Miller, supra note 4, at 70–71.
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achieved on the back of unfair transactions for consumers.
The norms and values that underpin and help assess the fair-
ness of transaction prices will be explored next.
C. Equality, Fairness, Privacy, Transparency, and Autonomy
1. Equality
By its essence, the practice of algorithmic personalized
pricing discriminates between different consumers, based on
various characteristics that relate to them (e.g., area code,
street address, type of device used to make purchase, purchase
history, gender, and age). Not surprisingly, the moral value of
equality—that, a priori, we should all be treated the same—
comes to mind when assessing the acceptability of personal-
ized pricing.
In a brick-and-mortar world, we are accustomed to uni-
form pricing—the same price tag applies to all, unless the cus-
tomer uses coupons or rewards points to receive a discount.108
Introduced with the advent of large department stores in the
late nineteenth century, uniform pricing changed the way con-
sumers purchased goods and services.109 Prior to that,
purchasing goods and services involved bargaining, where the
supplier could apply their personal knowledge of a customer
in how they set their price, commonly occurring in bazaars
and small-town general stores.110 Efficiency was likely an im-
portant driver behind suppliers’ introduction of uniform pric-
ing.111 Incidentally, uniform pricing also embeds the value of
treating customers equally, and we have grown accustomed to
108. See Townley, Morrison & Yeung, supra note 4, at 712 (on how custom-
ers have become accustomed to uniform pricing as a social convention and
on the contrast between the physical store environment and online e-com-
merce).
109. See Brian Wallheimer, Are You Ready for Personalized Pricing? Companies
Are Figuring Out What Individual Customers Will Pay—and Charging Accordingly,
CHI. BOOTH REV. (Feb. 26, 2018), http://review.chicagobooth.edu/market-
ing/2018/article/are-you-ready-personalized-pricing (attributing the intro-
duction of price tags in retail stores in the United States, in the 1870s, to
John Wanamaker, with the advent of large department stores).
110. See Abnett, supra note 70.
111. This statement is made on the premise that one-on-one bargaining
may have worked in small-town general stores but was no longer tenable in
large department stores with increased volumes of merchandise and custom-
ers, it being too time-consuming and as sales clerks would be more detached
from the product than was the owner of the traditional store.
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this commercial practice, with the occasional exception of
farmers’ markets and bazaars where traditional practices co-
exist with more modern ones. Over time, price labeling laws
have reinforced the practice of uniform pricing imposing cer-
tain legal requirements.112 Such practice is transparent to con-
sumers, a value discussed further below in this part, and in
addition generally treats customers in the same location
equally.
Liberal free-market democratic ideals give leeway on the
value at which suppliers price goods or services.113 The bias
has traditionally been against regulation interfering with the
market.114 Viewed as coercive, legal intervention on how sup-
pliers price their goods is justified in limited cases, such as to
prevent harm to consumers,115 including human-right types of
discrimination (e.g., on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender,
and sexual orientation).116 Even if uniform pricing would
guarantee the same price for similar goods, nothing precludes
suppliers from charging a different price at a different loca-
tion. Thus, while brick-and-mortar uniform pricing practices
as reinforced by price label regulation embed equal treatment
of customers, the uniformity of pricing practices and equality
of treatment in that regard have never been absolute.117 The
widespread commercial practice of coupons and fidelity dis-
counts comes to mind. Uniform pricing label laws may have
more to do with a requirement of disclosure and transparency
in the relationship between seller and buyer than with a re-
quirement of equality between buyers.
While law and common practice allow a great amount of
flexibility in how suppliers set their prices, it seems difficult to
112. See, e.g., N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 197-b (McKinney 2006); N.Y.
AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 214-h (McKinney 2013); Consumer Protection Act,
C.Q.L.R., c. P-40.1, § 223 (Can.).
113. See Miller, supra note 4, at 68 (citing generally FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK,
THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944) and MILTON FRIEDMAN WITH ROSE D. FRIED-
MAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962)).
114. See id.; see also PAOLO SICILIANI, CHRISTINE RIEFA & HARRIET GAMPER,
CONSUMER THEORIES OF HARM: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH TO CONSUMER LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND POLICY MAKING 92 (2019) (“[R]eceived wisdom is that
public intervention is less effective at eradicating consumer detriment than
relying on the natural tendency of markets to self-correct.”).
115. See Townley, Morrison & Yeung, supra note 4, at 710, 721.
116. See, e.g., Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, § 3 (Can.).
117. See Townley, Morrison & Yeung, supra note 4, at 711.
32 NYU JOURNAL OF LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 17:1
dismiss the value of equal treatment of consumers altogether.
How can we explain the strong distaste for personalized pric-
ing other than by the perceived injustice and expectation of
being treated a priori equally to another purchaser for the
same good purchased around the same time and place? Valu-
ing equality may also explain when discriminatory pricing be-
comes justified—i.e., when it increases social equality, such as
post-secondary education tuition fee rebates, for students who
could otherwise not afford it.118 Equality as an ideal may also
explain why group price discrimination (e.g., student or senior
rebates) is under increasing scrutiny from the standpoint that
the financial disparity between those groups and the rest of
the population—which was the traditional rationale for the
price discrimination—may no longer be justified.119
On the terrain of equality of treatment between individu-
als in pricing practices, is there not an important distinction
between differential treatment dictated by supplier constraints
(supply and demand, production costs, time of sale of perisha-
ble goods, etc.) and differential treatment based predomi-
nantly on consumer personal characteristics for the main (if
not sole) purpose of getting to their reservation price? Argua-
bly, it is when discrimination is based predominantly on con-
sumer personal characteristics, rather than on supplier legiti-
mate exigencies, that equality becomes a pertinent anchoring
value that merits closer attention on the basis that such price
differentiations are arbitrary when not founded on objective
supplier criteria, such as costs of production and delivery or
demonstrated increased value (e.g., added features to prod-
uct) offered to the consumer. While some price differentiation
is justified, human rights prohibitions against specific catego-
ries of discrimination (e.g., gender, race, sexual orientation)
are precisely there to eliminate unequal treatment on arbitrary
bases.
2. Fairness and Privacy
In addition to issues of equality, questions of fairness re-
garding personalized pricing may arise. These questions con-
118. See EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 4, at 118, 122.
119. But see Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c H-19 § 15 (Can.) (ex-
pressly allowing preferential treatment for people aged sixty-five years and
over).
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cern supplier-consumer relations rather than the relationship
between consumers offered the same product. Although
courts will generally not review the fairness of a contract on
the basis of freedom of contract, the requirement of fairness is
present in contract law doctrines protecting weaker parties
(e.g., duress, undue influence, and unconscionability) in the
doctrine of good faith, and in consumer contracts (e.g., statu-
tory “black lists” of commercial practices that are deemed un-
fair).120 The requirement of fairness in commercial transac-
tions intervenes mainly between the supplier and the con-
sumer (e.g., on the types of representations made and the
effects of inequality of bargaining power).121
In the context of algorithmic personalized pricing, fair-
ness issues may arise with respect to the magnitude and level
of consumer personal information collected, and how this may
constitute an abuse of the asymmetry of bargaining power and
information between supplier and consumer. Although an ar-
gument may also be made that the pricing process leading to
treating one consumer arbitrarily unequally vis-à-vis others is
unfair, fairness issues may also arise between consumers and
suppliers irrespective of the treatment of other consumers.
The unfairness related to the potential abuse in the col-
lection of personal data contemplated here refers not only to
the amount of personal data collected but also to the personal
purchasing power profile that is created about each consumer
through powerful algorithms. Whether the personal informa-
tion is to some extent publicly available is beside the point; it is
the level of intrusion into each of the consumers’ personal in-
tegrity and intimacy that is problematic as it touches upon con-
sumers’ expectations of privacy.
Referring to the work of Helen Nissenbaum on privacy
and the concept of “contextual integrity,” Townley, Morrison
& Yeung explain how perceptions of fairness of price discrimi-
120. See, e.g., Consumer Protection Act, S.O. 2002, c 30, Sched. A §§ 15–19
(Can.) (listing various false, misleading, deceptive, and unconscionable rep-
resentations as unfair practices allowing the consumer to rescind the con-
tract and to seek other remedies).
121. Through the application of the common-law doctrines of misrepre-
sentation and doctrines seeking to protect weaker parties—in particular, un-
conscionability. See, e.g., Bhasin v. Hrynew, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 494, paras. 42–43
(Can.); Douez v. Facebook, Inc., [2017] 1 S.C.R. 751, paras. 129, 131–34
(Can.); Uber Tech. Inc. v. Heller, 2020 SCC 16 paras. 54–91 (Can.).
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nation are highly incumbent on social norms, customs, and
trade practices.122 Consumers have substantive expectations
about proper and improper uses of their personal information
that are molded by social norms or “standards of good behav-
ior” within a particular context.123 From that, Townley, Morri-
son & Yeung argue that personalized pricing could be unfair
dealing to the extent that it is a violation of consumers’ sub-
stantive expectation of privacy or “contextual integrity.”124 The
“contextual integrity” of privacy relates to the requirement of
proportionality found in privacy regulation, under which busi-
nesses are bound to process only such personal information
that is reasonably justified relative to its intended declared
purpose, regardless of whether the consumer has consented to
the collection of such personal information or not.125
In contrast with a brick-and-mortar store, online prices
are not uniform or transparent.126 Over time, one could argue
that consumers’ expectation of use of their personal data in e-
commerce may change and a practice deemed unfair now may
no longer be so then.127 There are several difficulties with the
argument that the processing of personal data leading to per-
sonalized pricing may become acceptable and fair as consum-
ers will become increasingly aware of such practices over time.
This argument of consumer awareness ties the fairness of a
practice too heavily with whether it has been disclosed to the
consumer or their general awareness of it. Disclosing the use
of personal information and the practice of personalized pric-
122. Townley, Morrison & Yeung, supra note 4, at 710–12 (citing Helen
Nissenbaum, A Contextual Approach to Privacy Online, 140 DAEDALUS 32
(2011)).
123. Id. at 711–12.
124. Id. at 710–11.
125. See Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act,
S.C. 2000, c 5, Sched. 1, §§ 4.5, 6.1 (Can.) [hereinafter PIPEDA]; see also
CCPA, supra note 39, § 1798.140(d) (distinguishing personal information
collected for a “business purpose” that relates to information reasonably nec-
essary for a business’s operational purposes from other purposes); id. at
§ 1798.100(b) (noting, however, that CCPA § 1798.140(d) does not prohibit
use of personal information for other, nonbusiness purposes, but rather,
that there is an obligation imposed to disclose such additional purposes); id.
§ 1798.120(a) (providing that consumers have the right to opt out from per-
sonal information being sold to third parties).
126. See Townley, Morrison & Yeung, supra note 4, at 712.
127. See id.
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ing may make the practice less unfair than when it remains
secretive, but it does not necessarily make the practice fair al-
together. Also, a growing awareness of use of personal informa-
tion may be an elusive concept, as consumers will hardly ever
be fully aware of the magnitude of personal information used
in any given context, and arguably regardless of how detailed
the disclosure of personal data use and collection would be.128
As sophistication increases in the collection and processing of
personal information, coupled with the lack of transparency
surrounding such commercial practices, the disproportionate
and undue advantage it will give to suppliers to the detriment
of consumers will likely persist, regardless of some level of
awareness of the practice by consumers.
At a substantive level, the (un)fairness of personalized
pricing may simply boil down to this: it is hard to justify charg-
ing different prices to two persons for the exact same product
strictly based on each person’s ability to pay, without some
greater goal (e.g., improving social equality) or benefit to the
consumer (e.g., improved product), and when the main, if not
sole motivator, is to improve the supplier’s bottom line.129
Also, the intrusiveness of the process that enables the practice
(i.e., collecting and processing personal data), or that some-
one is “sizing your wallet,” raises important questions of fair-
ness. It accentuates even more existing asymmetries of product
knowledge, bargaining power, etc. between buyer and seller.
128. See OECD SUMMARIES OF CONTRIBUTIONS, supra note 99, at 14 (quot-
ing the U.K. submission: “Transparency alone will not necessarily adequately
address the risk of consumer harm and the quality of disclosure is vital. The
disclosure of information on personalization will serve little positive purpose
if the information provided to the consumer is misleading, confusing or oth-
erwise not comprehensible to the consumer and/or does not give the con-
sumer a real choice (for example, the disclosure is made very late in the
transactional process)”).
129. See EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 4, at 122 (explaining when discrimi-
natory pricing might be acceptable: if there is a social goal, if it improves the
overall product, and if it is transparent); see also OECD COMPETITION COM-
MITTEE, supra note 1, at 24 (“While consumers certainly differ in their will-
ingness to pay, it is not clear whether this should justify consumers being
charged different prices for the same or very similar product. Moreover, the
perception of what is fair may depend not only on the specific beliefs of the
consumers, but also on the dimensions upon which consumers are subject to
discrimination.”).
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At a macro level, if algorithmic personalized pricing leads
to an overall decrease in consumer welfare while increasing
supplier welfare, fairness may tie into a distributive justice ar-
gument, not as consumer-to-consumer as sometimes invoked
in support of discriminatory pricing, but as between consumer
and supplier.130
3. Transparency and Autonomy
Transparency is connected to fairness. As discussed above,
although transparency may not make a practice fair at a sub-
stantive level, a lack of transparency to consumers may make a
commercial transaction more unfair.131 Transparency comes
into play on two fronts: first, as to whether personalized pric-
ing is taking place; and second, with respect to the scope of
access to and of use of consumer personal data. Transparency
on the collection of personal data will not necessarily make a
commercial practice comply with privacy requirements when
the collection fails to meet the proportionality requirement—
i.e., the amount of personal data is not justified relative to the
intended purpose of the collection.132
We value transparency in consumer transactions and the
disclosure requirements associated with it, as they are per-
ceived as promoting consumer autonomy. For instance, clear,
simple, and accurate product labels shorten search costs and
allow consumers to differentiate between products and make
informed choices that suit their needs. Disclosure requirement
laws, such as some privacy regulations, are founded on a view
of promoting consumer choice and autonomy.133 However,
transparency does not necessarily allow consumers to exercise
their autonomy when they are left with limited or unattractive
alternatives, when they do not understand or do not agree to
the consequences of what is being disclosed, or worse, when
130. See generally Rory Van Loo, Broadening Consumer Law: Competition, Pro-
tection, and Distribution, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 211 (2019) (arguing that
macroeconomic distribution needs to become a more explicit goal of con-
sumer law).
131. See supra Section V.C.2 (detailing fairness and privacy).
132. See PIPEDA, supra note 125, § 6.1.
133. See, e.g., CCPA, supra note 39, §§ 1798.100(b), 1798.120(a) (requiring
businesses to disclose the type and purpose of personal information they use
or sell to third parties, with a consumer right to opt out for personal infor-
mation sold to third parties).
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they should not even be given the choice that is presented to
them in the guise of normalcy and respectability.134 Being
transparent to consumers about their personal data being
used to set personalized pricing potentially raises all of these
concerns and is suboptimal when it comes to promoting con-
sumers’ autonomy. To the extent that the practice raises im-
portant equality and fairness issues, the choice of allowing per-
sonalized pricing to take place should arguably not be given to
consumers in the first place.
In sum, a presumption of being treated equally a priori,
although not absolute, should be considered when evaluating
the adequacy of algorithmic personalized pricing and to a
greater extent than with respect to other forms of price dis-
crimination that are not related to consumers’ individual char-
acteristics. The practice also raises issues of fairness when
there is no valid justification (e.g., increasing social equality)
or benefit to the consumers, compounded by the intrusiveness
of the access and use of consumers’ personal information that
are required to practice algorithmic personalized pricing.
More transparency about the practice and level of personal in-
formation taken will not make algorithmic personalized pric-
ing fair, as it will not cure the substantive concerns about the
commercial practice; however, removing the cloud of secrecy
through disclosing the practice to consumers will make it
somewhat less unfair at this level. Potential encroachments of
consumers’ privacy are closely connected to values of fairness
and transparency. In considering all of these underlying values
and their possible erosion, Ezrachi and Stucke invite us to
think about greater societal harm beyond our individual pock-
etbook, such as the social environment trust in firms and mar-
ketplace,135 to which one may add consumer market sus-
134. See generally Luguri & Strahilevitz, supra note 76; U.S. Complaint,
supra note 36, para. 9 (“At least tens of millions of American users relied on
Facebook’s deceptive privacy settings and statements to restrict the sharing
of their information to their Facebook Friends, when, in fact, third-party
developers could access and collect their data through their Friends’ use of
third-party developers’ apps.”).
135. EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 4, at 129; U.K. OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING,
PERSONALISED PRICING - INCREASING TRANSPARENCY TO IMPROVE TRUST 4, 24
(2013), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426/http:/
www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/markets-work/personalised-pricing/oft1489.pdf
(warning about the general distrust that personalized pricing practices could
create in the marketplace and emphasizing the lack of transparency as an
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tainability, and overall consumers’ levels of indebtedness and a
rise in inequality.
VI.
REGULATORY AVENUES TO CONSIDER
The analysis conducted in this article on the normative
considerations surrounding algorithmic personalized pricing
leads to three possible regulatory approaches. The first ap-
proach is to delineate condemnable aspects of personalized
pricing at a substantive level that should be banned. The sec-
ond approach is not to ban any form of algorithmic personal-
ized pricing per se but to require stringent disclosure obliga-
tions from suppliers to consumers about suppliers’ use of con-
sumers’ personal data in setting differential prices, with a
genuine and valid opportunity for consumers to opt out of this
practice. The third avenue is the status quo—i.e., to leave the
regulation of personalized pricing to the traditional ap-
proaches of competition, privacy, contract, consumer protec-
tion, and antidiscrimination laws. This part outlines why the
first approach—i.e., setting bright-line rules around accept-
able forms of personalized pricing—is preferable.
A. Ban on Certain Forms of Algorithmic Personalized Pricing
In the absence of personalized pricing practices that
amount to an anticompetitive practice (e.g., abuse of a domi-
nant position, collusion, price fixing), are discriminatory
under human rights laws, or involve some form of misrepre-
sentation in contract law, specific bans on personalized pricing
are not frequently proposed.136 This is hardly surprising, as
firms’ decisions regarding pricing practices have traditionally
been regarded, in competitive markets at least, as better left
unattended, subjected as they are to market forces.137 How-
ever, concerns raised in this article about consumer equality,
important contributor of such distrust); OECD COMPETITION COMMITTEE,
supra note 1, at 26.
136. See Wagner & Eidenmüller, supra note 4, at 589–90 (viewing a ban on
personalized pricing as too extreme, given that the main effect of personal-
ized pricing is to lower consumer surplus); OECD U.S. SUBMISSION, supra
note 85, at 2, 6.
137. See Miller, supra note 4, at 68; OECD U.S. SUBMISSION, supra note 85,
at 4; SICILIANI, RIEFA & GAMPER, supra note 114, at 92.
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fairness, privacy, and transparency regarding personalized
pricing, amid the rapid evolution of personal data algorithmic
analytics in e-commerce, should lead to reconsidering bans as
a justifiable option in certain circumstances.
The following parameters should inform the justifications
and methods for prohibiting certain practices of personalized
pricing. Personalized pricing should be banned to the extent
that it involves the intrusive use of consumers’ personal infor-
mation with the sole (or predominant) purpose to maximize
suppliers’ profits, with no justification based on different qual-
ities of product attributes, other benefit to the consumer, or
on suppliers’ legitimate requirements (e.g., variation in pro-
duction and distribution costs).138 The underlying principles
that justify this ban include (1) a starting point of equality be-
tween consumers, regardless of their personal characteristics,
given the arbitrariness that comes with such differentiations
(as opposed to exigencies justifying discrimination on the ba-
sis of production, supply costs, different features, or ranges of
product quality); (2) a lack of demonstrated benefit to compe-
tition; (3) a lack of transparency toward consumers and the
public in the amount and the purpose of personal data collec-
tion; (4) the contravention of privacy principles of proportion-
ality in the amount of collected personal information relative
to its intended purpose; (5) consumers’ reasonable expecta-
tions and understanding regarding collection and handling of
their personal information (regardless of presumed consent);
and (6) accumulation of supplier knowledge deepening asym-
metry of power between suppliers and consumers.139 Last but
not least, economic efficiency and maintaining consumers’
138. The lack of supplier-consumer reciprocity and proportionality in the
amount of personal information used by the supplier relative to product or
service being supplied, from which unfairness arises, goes above and beyond
algorithmic personalized pricing; it is one defining trait of the personal data
extraction economy. See ZUBOFF, supra note 26, at 10, 94.
139. See Miller, supra note 4, at 80 (discussing consumer deception arising
from their mistaken assumptions about their comparative position in the
market and relative advantages of one bargain over another and noting that,
in this light, “the purpose of consumer information regulation is to protect
shoppers’ ability to resist the growing power of the retailers to shape market-
place behavior”); see also Bar-Gill, supra note 4, at 242 (arguing that personal-
ized pricing should be curbed in instances when it “targets misperception-
based [willingness to pay] in addition to preference-based [willingness to
pay].”).
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trust in the marketplace further support the ban for those
forms of personalized pricing that lead to inefficiencies and
distrust, and may give rise to a vacuous, unproductive techno-
logical arms race between suppliers and consumers, resulting
in a wasteful use of resources.140 These factors combined or
individually (depending on their gravity) contain enough ele-
ments to justify banning the practice of personalized pricing at
a substantive level, as among the camp of unfair commercial
practices and a potential breach of privacy law. The ban could
take various forms, including singling out as an unfair com-
mercial practice specific data collection and uses from ever
forming part of any pricing offer.141
There is no valid reason to wait for more empirical evi-
dence on the extent and degree to which algorithmic person-
alized pricing is happening. A principled approach should
guide the next generation of consumer law and policy to prop-
erly address the proliferation of algorithmic big data analytics
in the digital marketplace for the greater benefit of all its par-
ticipants.
The main pitfall of the outright ban proposed here in-
cludes the loopholes of various interpretations of the ban’s
contours, as well as the difficulty of detecting noncompliance.
Paradoxically, a regulatory option that focuses on the procedu-
ral aspects of personalized pricing without banning it (i.e.,
mandating the disclosure of how personal data is collected
and used for pricing purposes) could in the end benefit con-
sumers more positively than an outright ban of the practice.
Although not the preferred route, as it fails to address impor-
tant concerns around algorithmic personalized pricing at the
substantive level, the regulatory avenue of mandatory disclo-
sure is worth exploring further.
B. Mandatory Disclosure
Short of an outright ban of algorithmic personalized pric-
ing as described above, mandating suppliers to disclose to con-
sumers that they are collecting and using their personal data
for the purpose of their pricing offerings is one avenue to ad-
dress at a procedural level the unfairness arising from the lack
of transparency. This approach also addresses consumer de-
140. See Miller, supra note 4, at 66.
141. See id. at 104.
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ception arising from the collection of personal information for
personalized pricing purposes.142 Already in place in the Euro-
pean Union,143 and more recently in California,144 this model
of privacy regulation is often invoked as the preferred means
to tackle problematic aspects of algorithmic personalized pric-
ing.145 A requirement to disclose the practice of personalized
pricing has at least two benefits, assuming firms’ adequate
compliance with the requirement and the relative effectiveness
142. See OECD COMPETITION COMMITTEE, supra note 1, at 38 (recommen-
dations of mandatory disclosure); Miller, supra note 4, at 83 (discussing dis-
closure requirements grounded in principle of consumer autonomy: “The
principle of consumer autonomy justifies empowering consumers to know
how their personal identity and buying choices impact their position in the
market”).
143. See EU GDPR, supra note 38, § 13(1)(c) (stating that, when personal
data is collected, it imposes at the time of collection a “duty to disclose the
purposes of the processing for which the personal data are intended as well
as the legal basis for the processing”); Zuiderveen Borgesius & Poort, supra
note 4, at 356 (describing the effect of the EU GDPR as applying to price
discrimination and forcing suppliers to disclose the practice in clear and
unequivocal terms to their consumers, as opposed to general terms on the
collection of personal data).
144. See CCPA, supra note 39, § 1798.100(b) (requiring businesses that
collect consumer personal information to disclose categories of personal in-
formation and purposes for which personal information will be used); id.
§ 1798.110(a)(3) (imposing, at the consumer’s request, an obligation to dis-
close the business or commercial purpose for collecting or selling personal
information).
145. See U.S. PRESIDENT EXECUTIVE OFFICE, supra note 33, at 17; OECD
COMPETITION COMMITTEE, supra note 1, at 38; OECD SUMMARIES OF CONTRI-
BUTIONS, supra note 99, at 14 (UK submission); EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra
note 4, at 227 (suggesting clearer disclosure of use of personal information
such as “(1) pop-up windows that inform us when and what info is being
harvested and when being tracked; (2) clear indication of when personal-
ized prices are displayed”); Miller, supra note 4, at 83; Townley, Morrison &
Yeung, supra note 4, at 715 (suggesting the minimum requirements of a dis-
closure regime “inform consumers in advance: (i) that prices offered online
to any customer may differ from those offered to other customers; (ii) that
their personal digital data, including data acquired from continuous track-
ing of their online behavior, may be used to construct consumer profiles
that form the operative basis for determining the prices at which goods will
be offered to them, and (iii) of the full range of variables which affect the
algorithmic determination of how the prices of goods and services are calcu-
lated (this need not entail disclosure of the underlying algorithm itself, nor
the costs associated with production of the relevant good/service - only of
the algorithmic variables and the directions in which they can be expected
to move)”); Wagner & Eidenmüller, supra note 4, at 584.
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of the disclosure in light of inherent limits of any information
disclosure requirement.146 First, disclosure would lift the veil
on mostly concealed practices that would enable more focused
data gathering to study personalized pricing on the various le-
gal grounds reviewed in this article. Second, one may surmise
that, considering the marked disdain consumers have toward
the practice, a disclosure requirement could put a significant
halt to the practice of personalized pricing altogether.147
Algorithmically “sizing one’s wallet” may entail a high
level of intrusion into the consumer’s privacy that may under-
standably come out as disproportionate and unjustified to
many consumers when the intended purpose is to set the opti-
mal price for suppliers. As a result, disclosing personalized
pricing may not be the key to making personalized pricing fair
or acceptable,148 as it may stop the practice from occurring
altogether. If compelled to disclose the practice, suppliers will
likely be less inclined to apply personalized pricing,149 assum-
ing that any regulation mandating disclosure would be effi-
cient through compliance and adequate enforcement.
The traditional legal landscape would continue to apply,
as augmented by the mandatory disclosure requirement pro-
posed here. As a subset of alternatives, the regulatory avenue
of mandatory unequivocal disclosure of personalized pricing
could coexist with the ban of some forms of personalized pric-
ing proposed earlier, in that it could apply to all other forms
of personalized pricing not covered by the ban. This would
promote greater transparency in the marketplace. Such
mandatory disclosure would need to be constructed in a way
that does not encourage collusion among competitors.150
146. See OECD COMPETITION COMMITTEE, supra note 1, at 37–39; OECD
SUMMARIES OF CONTRIBUTIONS, supra note 99, at 14 (UK submission); see also
EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 4, at 226 (“the notice-and-consent privacy
model is broken.”); Wagner & Eidenmüller, supra note 4, at 604.
147. See supra Part III.
148. Transparency is referred to as one of the requirements to make per-
sonalized pricing acceptable. See, e.g., EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 4, at
122.
149. See supra Part III.
150. OECD COMPETITION COMMITTEE, supra note 1, at 38; see also EZRACHI
& STUCKE, supra note 4, at 35–81 for a detailed analysis of the extent to
which the use of algorithms may facilitate the creation of cartels. See generally
Terrell McSweeny & Brian O’Dea, The Implications of Algorithmic Pricing for
Coordinated Effects Analysis and Price Discrimination Markets in Antitrust Enforce-
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Proponents of mandatory disclosure are also quick to
point out the shortcomings and limited effectiveness of any
form of disclosure to consumers in an environment of infor-
mation overkill.151 To be more effective, the disclosure about
the practice of personalized pricing should impose conspicu-
ous,152 clear, and unequivocal terms. It should also give con-
sumers the ability to opt out153—i.e., to still be able to
purchase the product, with a clear explanation of the conse-
quences of that option.
These seemingly innocuous disclosure requirements lay
bare the uneasiness that suppliers will most likely experience
in the process. Although this approach appears to be sound
and legitimate by ensuring greater transparency while offering
alternative options to consumers, it is hard to conceptualize a
genuine opting-out scenario whereby consumers can still
purchase a product without having their personal data col-
lected in the pricing process. The choice to opt out is more
likely to become a decision to refrain from purchasing the
ment, 32 Antitrust 75 (2017); Ashwin Ittoo & Nicolas Petit, Algorithmic Pricing
Agents and Tacit Collusion: A Technological Perspective, in L’INTELLIGENCE AR-
TIFICIELLE ET LE DROIT 241 (Hervé Jacquemin & Alexandre de Streel eds.,
2017).
151. OECD COMPETITION COMMITTEE, supra note 1, at 38; OECD SUMMA-
RIES OF CONTRIBUTIONS, supra note 99, at 14 (UK Submission stating: “Trans-
parency alone will not necessarily adequately address the risk of consumer
harm and the quality of disclosure is vital. The disclosure of information on
personalization will serve little positive purpose if the information provided
to the consumer is misleading, confusing or otherwise not comprehensible
to the consumer and/or does not give the consumer a real choice (for exam-
ple, the disclosure is made very late in the transactional process).”); see also
EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 4, at 226 (“[T]he notice-and-consent privacy
model is broken.”); Wagner & Eidenmüller, supra note 4, at 604.
152. See EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 4, at 227 (citing specific pop-up
windows with brief notification as opposed to buried lengthy terms of service
as one possible approach).
153. See, e.g., Wagner & Eidenmüller, supra note 4, at 590–91, 605–06; EU
GDPR, supra note 38, § 21 (granting a right for data subjects to object to the
collection of personal data, including when personal data is collected for
marketing purposes, and for the removal of such personal data processing);
CCPA, supra note 39, § 1798.120(a) (giving consumers the right to opt out,
but only with respect to their personal information being sold to third par-
ties); Id. § 1798.125 (providing nondiscrimination safeguards for consumers
electing to opt out).
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product altogether.154 Indeed, it is hard to conceive a supplier
pricing model that would employ personalized pricing with
some and not with others. This difficulty to accommodate rea-
sonable consumer requirements is another indicator that puts
to the test the legitimacy of deeper forms of personalized pric-
ing. What would disclosure look like? How can a fair alterna-
tive to personalized pricing exist without making the whole
practice crumble altogether?
C. Status Quo
The last and least preferred regulatory avenue is to rely
on the traditional regulatory frameworks in place with no
change whatsoever in any given area of law, either because of a
perceived lack of evidence on the effects of algorithmic per-
sonalized pricing, or because of faith that the current regula-
tory framework can address valid concerns for consumers.155
The concerns with personalized pricing, substantive argu-
ments to intervene with at least some forms of it, and the bene-
fits of setting bright-line rules where firms take advantage of
gray areas all weigh against taking the status quo approach to
algorithmic personalized pricing. Lawmakers and govern-
ments must be willing to acknowledge that significant transfor-
mations of methods of doing business call for a review of intru-
sive and abusive practices against which consumers need ade-
quate protection for a sustainable digital marketplace.156 In
this realm, the bigger obstacle for legislative reform may not
154. But see CCPA, supra note 39, § 1798.125 (providing nondiscrimina-
tion safeguards for consumers electing to opt out (e.g., with respect to qual-
ity of service received), but only with respect to their personal information
being sold to third parties).
155. See OECD U.S. SUBMISSION, supra note 85, at 2, 6 (positing that, sub-
ject to violating antitrust law (e.g., collusion) or consumer law (e.g., misrep-
resenting that discriminatory pricing is not taking place) as such, discrimina-
tory pricing warrants no justification to intervene); see also EZRACHI &
STUCKE, supra note 4, at 127–28 (on how issues of discriminatory pricing,
even if potentially illegal, are low on competition agencies’ enforcement
agenda, particularly in a U.S. context).
156. See Odlyzko, supra note 6, at 365 (noting the likelihood that many
governments are likely not to intervene and support suppliers’ indiscrimi-
nate use of personal data for the advantages that it may provide them).
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be the lack of available solutions so much as vantage points
tainted by entrenched ideology and lack of political will.157
D. Other Options
In addition to the possible avenues for the regulation of
personalized pricing explored in this section, other ap-
proaches include the mandatory disclosure of a floor price, in
keeping with traditional labeling law requirements,158 and
price caps (or personalized price caps).159 Another big-data
regulatory framework proposal that extends beyond issues spe-
cific to algorithmic personalized pricing includes “privacy by
design.” Under this proposed framework, privacy would be the
default rule, and consumers would have to opt in for their data
to be tracked online, with express meaningful notifications
and consent required along the way.160 Such regulatory design
would address the procedural unfairness and lack of trans-
parency discussed earlier. It could also reduce the frequency
of personalized pricing and similar commercial practices. Yet
it would not solve personalized pricing at a substantive level as
it would still allow the practice to occur. While “privacy by de-
sign” frameworks rely on noble goals that seek to safeguard
consumer privacy, the two-track opt-in stay-out regime that
they would create gives rise to practical considerations that call
into question their possible future application and viability.161
157. EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 4, at 231–32 (pointing out challenges
to regulatory reform: (i) ideology around how markets operate and the goals
of competition law; (ii) political will and possible effects of intellectual and
regulatory capture; (iii) lack of tools to address complex issues; and (iv) a
cautionary approach in light of legal uncertainty, enforcement costs, uncer-
tainty of effects of new regulatory designs, and possible effects of regulatory
intervention).
158. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 4, at 80–81 (arguing that such a regulatory
requirement might eliminate legitimate forms of personalized pricing—e.g.,
the ones based on supplier legitimate exigencies as opposed to those based
predominantly on consumers’ personal characteristics).
159. See Bar-Gill, supra note 4, at 243 (noting that price caps provide a
more appropriate response to personalized pricing); see also Townley, Morri-
son & Yeung, supra note 4, at 720 (suggesting that price caps should only be
used where there is sustained evidence of consumer harm in specific indus-
tries and other remedies have failed).
160. See EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 4, at 226–27.
161. See supra Section VI.B.
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Algorithm audits of various forms are frequently offered
as a possible solution to “crack the code” or to ensure certain
legal controls.162 Although some forms of algorithm audits
have potential,163 the complexity of the task, time and exper-
tise required, and the potential of meaningful outcomes, raise
several questions and skepticism about their effectiveness.164
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The conflicting norms, principles, and values around al-
gorithmic personalized pricing analyzed in this article raise im-
portant fairness concerns when looking at this commercial
practice from a consumer perspective. Many other areas of in-
quiry have not been explored in detail, including how greater
cohesion between privacy, consumer, commercial, antitrust,
and antidiscrimination laws and their enforcement may better
address the many challenges raised by the ubiquitous use of
consumer personal data in all spheres of life.
The preferred regulatory approach to algorithmic person-
alized pricing proposed in this article is to ban certain forms of
this commercial practice to address the fairness concerns at a
substantive level. This position is in stark contrast with the reg-
ulatory laissez-faire approach that has prevailed so far on the
use of personal data in e-commerce, relying heavily on the
rhetoric of consumer convenience and access to innovation,
with little oversight and few boundaries ensuring consumer
fairness and privacy along the way.
The often-preferred solution of mandatory disclosure
would not solve the issues raised at a substantive level. Disclo-
sure requirements may have the positive effect of limiting the
practice of algorithmic personalized pricing altogether, given
that suppliers are well aware of the aversion consumers gener-
ally have toward various forms of differential pricing. However,
162. See EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 4, at 230 (noting the possibility of
monitoring firms’ algorithms as another method of promoting greater trans-
parency); see also Van Loo, supra note 11, at 1383–86 (discussing the merits
of developing a firm supervision program conducted by the FTC).
163. For instance, audits making suppliers accountable for complying with
certain output requirements may be more fruitful than lengthy reviews of
lines of code.
164. See EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 4, at 230–31; see also Wagner &
Eidenmüller, supra note 4, at 603–04.
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this assumes certain safeguards are in place, which may be dif-
ficult to implement in practice.
The parameters and justifications that lead to recom-
mending a ban of certain forms of algorithmic personalized
pricing should inform the regulation of the use of consumer
personal data beyond algorithmic personalized pricing. Those
parameters are (1) a starting point of equality between con-
sumers regardless of their personal characteristics, given the
arbitrariness that comes with such differentiations (when not
based on legitimate product attributes, operations, or supply
exigencies justifying discrimination); (2) the level of propor-
tionality and reciprocity regarding the amount of intrusion
into consumers’ personal data relative to the intended pur-
pose of the use of personal data and benefit to consumers,
touching upon privacy protection principles and benefits to
competition (or lack thereof); (3) transparency toward con-
sumers and the public in the amount and purpose of personal
data collected; (4) consumers’ reasonable expectations and
understanding regarding collection and handling of their per-
sonal information; and (5) accumulation of supplier knowl-
edge that deepens asymmetries of power between suppliers
and consumers. Finally, responding to consumer-citizens’ rea-
sonable expectations of efficiency in the digital marketplace
and maintaining greater trust in the networked society should
be top of mind for law- and policymakers and relevant regula-
tory agencies.
